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Abstract
This article argues that recent political changes in Bolivia, leading to the first 
indigenous president in the country’s history being inaugurated in 2006, unsettled 
the traditional schemes of societal stratification, as well as the traditionally accepted 
markers of elite-hood. As a consequence, not only have new elites come to the 
fore, but they also modified the material, symbolic and political parameters with 
which elites demonstrate and affirm their position, leading to new searches for 
self-positioning as elites. Some sectors of the old elites developed an egoistic, 
revengeful subjectivity bringing bloodshed to the country. The new elite, on the 
contrary, is fragmented, confused and in part reluctant to perform as elite.
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In the new Bolivia represented by indigenous president Evo Morales, pres-
idential symbolism underwent a radical plot twist. On at least half of the 
photos published by newspapers and press agencies of the incumbent pres-
ident, “Evo” (as he is usually referred to by friend and foe) appears covered 
with confetti and adorned with a floral wreath. The pictures are seldom 
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taken in his presidential palace or in or around parliament. They are taken 
at all the places where the president speaks – villages, trade-union- meetings, 
social and political manifestations –, and where his messages to Bolivia and 
the world are voiced. Evo Morales is a tireless traveller across his country. 
In indigenous circles, to receive a high authority with flowers and confetti 
is common.
Never has the president been caught with a tie and jacket. As a matter 
of fact, the – possibly apocryphal – story goes that, after his pre-inaugura-
tion-tour through Europe in early 2006, Morales was criticized for con-
tinuously wearing a woollen jersey on all his encounters with European 
government leaders, presidents and even the Spanish king. Wearing such a 
woollen sweater, often alpaca,1 is very common among Bolivia’s indigenous 
majority population: the highlands, their original habitat, are cold. Never-
theless, it was seen by many as too big a divergence from the dress code at 
international meetings. In spite of this, as the story goes, Evo Morales still 
refused the tie and jacket. It was in his view too reminiscent of the standard 
outfit of the type of politicians he had fiercely opposed in the years before 
he was elected president (December 2005), those politicians Evo had 
denounced as “neoliberals,” mank’agastos,2 and corrupt. Now, he asserted, 
not only a new power-holder but also a new ethnic presence and pride had 
to be presented. Still, most agreed, the jersey was a bit too inconspicuous. 
Therefore the most famous fashion designer of Bolivia, Beatriz Canedo 
Patiño, was asked to design something new. She came up with a sort of 
informal, blazer-like jacket, in different versions with various colours, 
adorned with strips or flounces of ahuayo-weavings3 inserted in the fabric. 
Such weavings are a traditional indigenous craft. Since then, Evo usually 
wears this “indigenous yet proper” apparel – and he hitherto has not been 
caught with a tie. But he did of course inherit the presidential plane, resi-
dence and luxury cars . . .
Evo and his political entourage believe they should relate to, and inter-
act with, their constituency and “the people” in general, in a new mode. 
They constitute, in a way, an anti-elite-elite; not only because of the 
1) The alpaca is an animal resembling a llama, famous for the high quality of its woollen 
fiber. 
2) Mank’agastos are “parasites,” those who become rich by exploiting, not by working.
3) Ahuayo-weavings are traditional aymara weavings, of finely spun camelid and sheep wool.
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 political rejection of what the old elite stood for, but also because of a dif-
ferent vision of what the relation between governors and governed should 
be. This new relation, still being construed every day, guides the new gov-
ernor’s self-presentations, impact-strategies and interactions – and the new 
elite often prefer to do so far away from the symbolically burdened build-
ings of power and stateliness in La Paz.
The difference with his predecessors is of course considerable. They used 
to be dressed top-notch, complying with all the “white powerholder 
world’s” conventions. They used to glimmer in or around the governmen-
tal and parliamentary infrastructures. The politicians and the wealthy were 
infamous for their arrogance, and often extravagance and fondness of any-
thing foreign.4 The wealthy, of course, are still present; only their political 
representatives have lost their positions. The rich, however, are fully aware 
of the crucial importance of a new political articulation – but this time 
with a new cloak and style. Remarkably, for instance, the current opposi-
tion in Bolivia often forsakes the formal wear as well. In their case, the 
motivation seems to be a wish to convey an image of hard-working, proto-
col-weary entrepreneurs, slaving away to contribute to Bolivia’s “modern-
ization.” They believe that their best strategy is not to counter Morales’s 
policies and support with decorum, but to present an image of tough 
workers whose efforts are paying off. They thus attempt to attract the rank 
and file with ambitions to improve their lot.
It should be added, that the opposition today is a localized one: hav-
ing lost out dramatically during the 2005 elections, and again during the 
2008 referendum, the economical and political elites of Bolivia opted 
for a geographic strategy to re-articulate. Concentrated in the relatively 
wealthy, natural resources-blessed department of Santa Cruz5 and other 
 departments in the east of the country, they made regional autonomy the 
4) They would hardly expect the middle and lower classes, and even less the indigenous, to 
emulate them. Being “genuine” dependent elites, they imitated those whom they admired. 
In Bolivia, emulation thus appears different from a simple of “trickling down” scheme (see 
Daloz 2007: 35–36).
5) Santa Cruz has enormous gas reserves. It is the largest of all the nine departments in 
Bolivia, and it is a (sub)tropical area with huge extensions of forest, grazing land, and arable 
land. Larger scale agriculture prevails. Santa Cruz also has the most unequal distribution of 
land in the country. According to Balderrama (2002), 73% of the land is in the hands of 
middle and big proprietors, representing 23% of total landowners, whereas 77% of the 
Santa Cruz rural population (individual peasants and indigenous communities) own 27% 
of the land.
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catalyst of their counter-strategy. Invoking regionalist sentiments, invok-
ing rumours about their department financing the poorer other regions, 
and accusing the government of centralistic meddlesomeness, they man-
aged to win a departmental referendum on regional autonomy in May 
2008 and inspired several other departments to follow suit. The Santa Cruz 
department being a subtropical region of Bolivia, the spokespersons of this 
opposition often appear during their speeches and on television interviews 
short-sleeved and without the tie – as if they had only briefly interrupted 
their hard work of managing a large enterprise. In their discourses they 
emphasize hard work, employment, exports and the departmental ambi-
tion to grow and prosper. Conspicuously, to underscore the regional iden-
tity, they will occasionally dress up in attire of the departmental, lowland 
indigenous peoples, suggesting a type of ethnic roots and authenticity. On 
the other hand, less leeway is given to the highland indigenous immi-
grants. Miss Bolivia 2005, coming from the region, declared that “in Santa 
Cruz we are white, tall, and we speak English.”
We will first sketch in a succinct way the traditional social divisions and 
concomitant behavioural codes in Latin America and Bolivia – divisions 
and codes that have been seriously challenged and diluted in recent years. 
This sketch will help us to address the issues of this “double” new elite 
constitution, and to understand the reasons why symbols, discourses and 
paraphernalia of both competing elites turn out to be so galvanizing for 
the one and infuriating for the other party. In the subsequent part, we will 
briefly outline the landscape of the contemporary political conflict in 
Bolivia. Next, we will go to the Santa Cruz region and focus on the new 
profile the traditional political and economic elites are assuming, combin-
ing new symbols with old schemes of “standing out” and of justifying their 
wealth and natural superiority. In the fourth part, we will visit the Bolivian 
highlands and delve into the ways the new political elite – with an unmis-
takable albeit controversial ethnic identity – assumes its novel eminence 
and is embedded in the ranks of its supporters; both the many poor, but 
also the conspicuously rich among them. Finally, we will attempt to draw 
some preliminary conclusions.
Traditional Elitism in Latin America
In most Latin American countries, traditionally, a marked gap between 
the different social groups existed. The continent is characterized by 
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 “imbalanced interest group systems in which the elites are well organized 
and represented” (Wiarda 2001: 337; see also Lievesley 1999). The result 
was, and still is, dramatic socio-economic inequality. And “(h)igh inequal-
ities bias the political rules of the game and mold polities in favour of the 
wealthy and the privileged, and they do so (to different degrees) whether 
regimes are authoritarian or democratic” (Karl 2003: 136). Due to the 
absence of solid institutional backing the equality of citizens, most coun-
tries on the continent were marked by the virtual non-existence of the 
societal codes of individual sovereignty, equality before the law, respect in 
treatment irrespective of family-name, appearance and prestige, effective 
access to public positions, individual liberties, and the like. It gave elites a 
privileged position going beyond the common advantages of higher spend-
ing patterns, and distinguished access to resources such as first class educa-
tion and healthcare; it also conferred them a kind of “right” to bypass the 
law. Elites would often illegally enrich themselves through plug money and 
the evasion of taxes, their sons would not pay their traffic fines, they would 
keep their kids out of military service, and they would not queue to get 
their bureaucratic chores done. “The reality is that, with few exceptions, 
rule is still based more on power than on law. Judicial systems are less 
about justice than providing protection for those who can pay for it and 
punishing those who can not” (Payne 1998, cited in Wiarda 2001: 339). 
The elite would, moreover, often look down upon their inferiors, look 
upon them with disregard, and underpay and abuse their nannies and gar-
deners. Most often, the subaltern would accept – albeit reluctantly – such 
treatment. Traditionally the symbolic power of the elites was compelling 
enough to make “people recognize the legitimacy of those who utter them” 
(Gledhill 2000: 144, see also Higley and Gunther 1995). People learn 
their “rights” in the course of their lifetime interactions with the state insti-
tutions and the “significant other classes.” “The actual (. . . .) consciousness 
of members of a class is the product of practical historical experiences of 
living-in-the-world” (Gledhill 2000: 140). What people, in such a situa-
tion, require from the system is not the full execution of the rule of law, 
but a somewhat better implementation of some of the concrete relation-
ships involved. What they aim for is a little less deceit, lying and rudeness 
in the inter-personal exchanges with functionaries and “high individuals,” 
and also to receive a somewhat better treatment and outcome. Most often, 
the relations with the elite would be personal, and not based on legal or 
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procedural prescriptions and/or entitlements (Damatta 1985; see also 
 Avritzer 2002: 73). One would not ask for one’s right, but for clemency or 
munificence. One would also try to call in “higher-up” connections to get 
things done: get a permit, get a kid enrolled in a school, get a job, and the 
like. Elites would however remain capricious, unpredictable and untouch-
able (Lehmann 1990). It made life difficult for non-elites; things were 
uncertain since it was not the formal rule or their own endeavours, but 
more often than not some elite’s fancy, which would decide on their lot. 
“[I]ndividuals get used to the idea that they are surrounded by a hostile 
and unfair world in which, however great the personal effort, positive 
results are never guaranteed” (Larrain 2000: 200).
The pattern, moreover, was frequently aggravated by a racial stratifica-
tion, sometimes coined a “pigmentocracy” (Larkin 2007). In many coun-
tries, darker skins would coincide with lower status – Anibal Quijano 
(2002) called this “a racial division of labour” – whereas elites would 
(thanks to their whiteness as well as their lifestyle) try to resemble as much 
as possible the European or North American models. Traditionally in Latin 
America, being elite was a privilege indeed. Societal interaction being 
slanted, the polity being their exclusive domain, the judicial system being 
unaccountable to public control and hardly “affordable”, and authoritari-
anism being daily routine, not much effort had to be given to legitimisa-
tion. But things have changed.
In Bolivia, in January 2005, the traditional “anti-elite” conquered polit-
ical power. Those who always mocked and criticized traditional elites and 
their box of tricks to appear as “leaders”, took over.
Bolivia’s Current Political Battlefield
Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, regained democracy after suf-
fering a long period of military dictatorship until 1982. But democracy did 
not deliver. Elitism, corruption, political exclusion and a mounting discon-
tent with neoliberal policies resulted in mass protests, especially after 2000. 
Trust in the traditional political elites withered, as they came to be seen as 
working only for the wealthy, and the blanco-mestizos (Tapia 2008: 16).
The process slowly but surely eroded the stature and taken-for-granted-
ness of the elite’s privileged access to governing circles. They increasingly 
failed to perform as groups that, being members of the upper social 
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 echelons, still connected to “the populace”, heard their concerns, and were 
dignified examples and leaders. The political parties’ campaigning dis-
courses hardly ever revealed analyses of Bolivia’s situation or visions for its 
future, and made no attempt to distinguish themselves from other political 
competitors through a focus on content. Party differences had nothing to 
do with alternative positions on policy, nor with efforts to articulate the 
interests of different societal sectors. Increasingly, the minority sectors of 
the population to which the various parties still did appeal were by and 
large the better-off sectors. This appeal was not one based on affinity with 
political analysis or policy statements, but one based on inherited family 
ties, clientelism, or prebendalism (Mayorga 2001). In Bolivia, the connec-
tion between people’s perceptions of political directions and actions on the 
one hand, and their access to the actors and entities embodying these 
directions and actions, on the other hand, broke down. As a consequence, 
a rift between the political dimension in society, on the one hand, and the 
polity, occupied by elites, on the other, emerged. This rift could only be 
mended by “unmediated” collisions between the two, as Bolivia witnessed 
since 2000. As from that year, an innumerable series of massive and some-
times violent protests struck the country. The protests, in a more or less 
direct way, undermined the status of the elites. Their attributes and atti-
tudes were increasingly seen as synonymous with deceitfulness. The politi-
cal elite, although clamping to its traditional symbolism and conceitedness 
as self-evident ruling clan, had lost its prestige.
The old elite of course maintained its status of wealth, and of being 
envied for its access to power-holding positions, its eloquence, and the 
like. But the esteem of the population for these elites, allegedly the only 
ones fit and capable for delivering the political foremen and cadres, crum-
bled between the 1990s and 2005. In December 2005, the tide turned: an 
indigenous presidential candidate who had managed to amalgamate the 
frustration and anger, won absolute majority in the first electoral round. 
All over sudden, the “ruled” now took over the state apparatus. Among 
many other things, it triggered a fierce political battle: the old elites used 
all the tricks in the book to prevent the new administration from pursu-
ing its programme. Bolivia’s current political situation is this: a some-
times grimy struggle over politics, but even more so over statuses, ethnic 
belonging and ranking, and over the country’s inherited socio-cultural 
 stratification.
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The Denial of Worthy-ness of the Subaltern: The Weapon 
of Autonomy
The elites, and their interests and imposition of political style, now were 
minority in the national arena. They regrouped regionally, demanding 
“autonomy” for the more “modern” departamentos in which they still ruled. 
The discourse revolving around such autonomy emerged as from 2000, 
but was much more vehemently staged after Evo Morales was chosen in 
2005. It was seen, by traditional elites regrouping in the eastern depart-
ments of, first and foremost, Santa Cruz and Beni, as a way to find legiti-
macy for their representation of the “region”, and thus combat their 
political opponent: the government of Evo Morales and all it represents.
The key building block of the traditional subjectivity of the traditional 
Bolivian elite is señorialismo (Zavaleta Mercado 1986). It is the conviction 
of being señor (e.g. being white, bureaucrat, landlord, learned and cul-
tured), in an overwhelmingly Indian world, which, even in the twentieth 
century, still “should” in the end be subordinate, and display paternal fol-
lowing and respect. But this status had eroded in the previous years, and 
had, as a matter of fact, already become “politically incorrect” since the 
1950s. As subjectivity, however, it had survived. The main discourse the 
tacit señorial elite constructed as from 2000, then, was autonomy. Auton-
omy by no means is a new banner in Bolivia: it was and is the motto of 
many mainly ethnic social movements in the country, and it was an impor-
tant demand in the quest for ethnic and cultural “self-determination” and 
territory. In the course of time, the signification of “autonomy” has shifted. 
In the parlance of the old elite in its new regional guise, it today stands for 
the “modern Bolivia”, based on the sovereignty of the individual, on a neo-
liberal economic model, and on a decentralized representative democracy. 
Ultimately, it stands for the policies prevailing in pre-2005 Bolivia.
Because the old order collapsed in the country’s administrative core (its 
state centre located in the occidente – the Andean region), now autonomy 
and independence from this centre, and the “unique-ness” of the oriente, 
have become crucial political signifiers (Laclau 2005), and a vehicle to 
preserve the bygone order at least in one’s “own region.” Since Bolivia as a 
whole obviously could not be “modern” (as the oriente’s elite would phrase 
it), at least some territories could. In the elite’s discourses, the so-called 
Media Luna was coined as the “modern Bolivia”, and was presented as 
opposed to the “archaic Bolivia.” This archaic Bolivia is portrayed as an 
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obsolete indigenous utopia; it is branded as obsessed by the nationalization 
of natural resources (and hence against the alleged contemporary common 
sense of foreign investment bringing employment and development), and 
as a dictatorship of indigenous communalism (whereas the “civilized 
world” has by now agreed on the superiority of individual freedom). In 
brief, autonomy-cum-modernity was now one of the vehicles of the old 
elites’ resistance against Evo Morales’ project.
It was one of the discursive tropes in its strategy to sabotage the debate 
about and the approval of a new constitution for Bolivia. This new consti-
tution was one of Morales’ electoral promises, and a societal demand since 
the ousting of president Goni in 2003. It was realized through the election 
of an Asamblea Constituyente in early 2006, but obstructed by the opposi-
tion factions since its installation. The new constitution was eventually 
approved by the Constituyente, but the process is contested and fiercely 
objected by the Media Luna.6 It explicitly acknowledges indigenous full 
citizenship, e.g. the entitlement of indigeneity combined with the “canoni-
cal” equality vis-à-vis the law. Additionally, this new constitution launches 
a new political institutionality, in which the state is conceived of as the 
delegated entity of a pluri-nation. Combined with other clauses and sec-
tions concerning state prerogatives and declarations against the commer-
cialisation of basic needs resources, the new constitution embodies the 
core stumbling block for the former elite. Their strategy entails pushing 
the autonomy-idea to its limits. Their scenario includes the possibility of a 
model in which several “states inside the state” exist, amputating the 
national government of its capacity to govern the national territory. This 
would enable them to preserve the nuts and bolts of their political power: 
the doxa-like “natural” inferiority of the indigenous and the collas, who in 
their view were meant to be peasants.7
6) At the time of writing this text, an agreement had been reached in parliament on a final 
draft version, and a referendum on this version was held on January 25, 2009. 61% of the 
Bolivian population supported the new text.
7) In Bolivian lowlands, “indigenous” (indígenas) is the term used today to designate the 
ancestral inhabitants of this territory (for instance the peoples like the Guaranies, Guarayos, 
Chiquitanos, Moxeños, and many others). “Peasant” (campesino or colonizador) is the term 
used for the Andean indigenous people that colonized new lands since 1952. Finally, Colla 
is the term used to refer to the Andean immigrants, highlighting their ethnic identity, 
irrespective of whether they live in urban or rural settings. We use the same terminology 
whenever we speak about the lowland discourses. 
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But after Morales’ second electoral victory at the occasion of the August 
2008 referendum, including an increase of his support in Media Luna ter-
ritory, part of the local elite was left perplexed and desperate; their “inborn” 
subjectivity as señorial elite was evidently collapsing. Taking into account 
different political actors’ subjectivity is, we believe, central to analyse their 
will to power, their political project, their strategies and possible alliances. 
Subjectivity is the manner a political actor places him/herself in the world, 
how he or she sees it and see themselves in it, and who they imagine to be 
their allies and opponents. In the case of Bolivia, this elite subjectivity was 
traditionally built upon an image of a “racial pyramid.” The elite’s privi-
leges were not only perceived as the fruits of astuteness or hard work, but 
as the logical order of things – in racial terms. Political contestations were 
accepted as unavoidable, but they were not supposed to undermine the 
underlying rule: that the racial stratification was a given.
When such preconditions begin to wear away, the very subjective 
“groundwork” for one’s political defence of interest falls to pieces. And 
perplexity and panic is the product when the underlying image of “a world 
that used to be mine” crumbles. The familiar world that used to be man-
ageable and coherent, in so far as there was a shared framework even with 
the political adversary, has withered. Subjectivities come into being in con-
figurations in which even adversaries are assumed to share specific cultural 
features and specific images about society’s make up. When the founda-
tions of that structure disintegrate, subjectivities providing for the initial 
self-confidence about the “us” and the values “making it worthwhile to 
fight for”, fade. A loss of orientation about the right and the wrong, and 
about the means justifying the end, may occur. The world begins to feel 
beyond one’s control, unknown, and the reaction often oscillates between 
paralysis and violence. In a way, even such violence might be considered a 
form of paralysis: it consists of ad-hoc eruptions of brutality, without any 
preset course of action underlying it, precisely because the sense-providing 
framework of one’s place-in-the-world has been lost.
As the given of señoralismo was shattered, an enormous anxiety in the 
former master’s psyche emerged: he is convinced that “the Indian” he has 
dominated wants revenge, wants to be the master. This idea that the main 
motive is that “the servant envies the master”, and wants to be master, is 
part of the master’s political calculation: he expects the other to act as he 
himself would have acted in such circumstances, and remains captured in 
a worldview constituted by “servants and masters.” According to this 
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worldview, the master’s own codes are mirrored: if the master feels entitled 
to use arms, violence, and even murder to defend his position in the world, 
he assumes that the rebelling servant will be ready to do the same. When 
the pongo,8 the indigenous, the colla immigrant no longer obeys his master, 
this produces confusion and indignation. When, however, the colla addi-
tionally does not behave the way the master assumes he would behave 
whenever he challenges his position and apparently aims for “master-
hood”, then perplexity and anxiety crop up. Not only the former hierar-
chy, but the very underlying assumption of hierarchy and dominance as 
the only thinkable societal arrangement, collapses. Perplexity, at the same 
time, incites to search for new certainties. In the case of the señorial elite, 
this certainty tends to construe its foundation and justification in the pos-
session of land. Land, especially among the most frightened and radica-
lised factions of the old elite, became a symbolic stronghold to their old 
position, as modernity and autonomy proved insufficient to keep the new 
order out. Land became the last bastion. Land symbolizes their impact on 
status at the national level; it stands – albeit more symbolically than in 
actual fact – for the traditional relation with the indigenous, the political 
control of people. The land becomes the justification for even hate towards 
this person who, categorically, remains the other. This categorically “other” 
is perceived as threatening the land, the last bulwark of the old image of 
one’s identity – and therefore ignites revulsion. The opponent destroyed 
almost everything that in earlier days seemed to hold the world together, 
including the “natural order” of domination, and eventually also emascu-
lating the defensive strategy of highlighting modernity and autonomy. The 
land remained as the final buffer against the world’s meltdown and there-
fore worthwhile defending as if the “attacker” was subhuman. The scenario 
came true on September 11, 2008, during a shooting in the Department 
of Pando in the north of Bolivia. A massacre by the “thugs” of the old elite 
left 18 people dead. It came on top of earlier actions such as demolishing 
the offices of state institutions, making threat calls and battering indige-
nous pedestrians in the eastern cities, thus impeding colla-looking persons 
8) A pongo is the indigenous servant. He/she lives on the landlord’s property, and works for 
him without receiving salary. This term was used in the Andean region before the National 
Revolution of 1952. In Eastern Bolivia, the term used is “empatronado” which literally 
means belonging to the landlord.
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to cross the main square or pass through the centre of cities like Santa 
Cruz, Sucre, Cobija, Tarija or Trinidad.
Anti-Elites as New Elites
Of Evo Morales it is told that, when he first entered the presidential palace, 
he was scared by the guards in front of and inside the palace (Sivak 2008: 
18). He is also known for giving official speeches in blue jeans and short 
sleeved and, more generally, for dodging the suit-and-tie uniform (Blasco 
Igual et al. 2007). “If what he represents is opposition to 600 years of 
exploitation, why should he wear a suit and tie?” asked Eduardo Gamarra, 
Bolivia expert at Florida International University.9 It typifies his back-
ground and long term “biotope”, and makes him a prototypical headman 
of a non-elite turned elite. And it produces a quandary for the new politi-
cal leaders: their image of a fairer Bolivian society includes a more horizon-
tal, less top-down polity. But to be able to bring this ideal nearer, they had 
to turn into leaders, into vanguard, into protagonists struggling to get their 
supporter’s backing, into elites. They need to convince as leaders, to be able 
to combat traditional (authoritarian) leadership. This presumes a subjec-
tivity which comes close to a contradiction in terms. Remarkably, they do 
this fairly well: they easily convince overwhelming majorities of Bolivians 
of the validity of their proposals and of their performance – except that 
their ability to realize and pull through the things is easier for their con-
stituencies to appreciate, than is their assurance that they will not become 
“haughty” or conceited. The insistence on rejecting being elites, and remain 
deferential and “obedient”, and to hold high the banner of humble-but-
proud indigeneity, however results in some paradoxes – especially in their 
relations with sectors supporting the government but with some “elitist” 
features. These sectors are well worthwhile analysing; they embody the 
process of a swop-over of societal formations. Probably there are three such 
sectors supporting Evo Morales, each with their own background, symbol-
ism and tailoring. And each of them wresting out a new subjectivity in a 
world they fought for to create – but have never known or lived before.
First, there are the intellectual and bohemian blanco-mestizos. They are 
the leftist journalists and columnists in the newspapers, the  progressive 
9) Quoted from an article by Marcela Sanchez in The Washington Post, January 13, 2006.
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 university professors, the NGO staff, the professionals in arts, educa-
tion, and the like. They often have a disdain for upper class ostentation 
and middle class “keeping up appearances.” Next there are the “wealthy 
Indians”, most often Aymara and Quechua, who have migrated to the 
 cities and done well. Most of them work in trade and in smuggling. They 
like to display their wealth during festivities such as Gran Poder.10 Finally, 
there are the leaders of social movements and intellectuals of indigenous 
origin. They were “upgraded” to elite since Evo Morales’ victory. Today, 
they are in ministries, in parliament, in think tanks and policy-preparing 
committees, or continue to run their organizations. They often loathe 
displays of power reminiscent of the previous powers-that-be.11 All three 
apply  specific emblems to distinguish themselves. And all three have 
their own, somewhat ambiguous relation to the new administration and 
to the old  politico-economic elites they either half-heartedly relate to, or 
deeply loath.
The intellectual and bohemian blanco-mestizos are the ones most famil-
iar with a privileged position. Although they are not really wealthy, they 
grew up in a society marked by a strong social hierarchy, to a great deal 
ethnically organized. They are the ones that, for generations, had access to 
higher education, in a country in which illiteracy rates, until very recently, 
were the highest in the continent, reaching levels of 20% of illiterates and 
37% of functional illiterates.12 They were also the ones that had grown up 
in families in which the empleada (maiden and nanny) never failed. Their 
resistance against injustice in the country, conservatism and narrow-mind-
edness, and racism, distinguished them from the blanco-mestizo majorities, 
but they were still marked by their socialization, their access to resources 
and their cosmopolitanism – which separated them from the subaltern 
majorities they sympathised with. They would probably boast about their 
close ties with indigenous fellow-citizens and treat them well, but they 
would – with the exception of some indigenist intellectuals – be more 
10) Gran Poder is a yearly grand indigenous festival in La Paz. Thousands of exuberantly 
dressed dancers take the main streets of the capital, celebrating Jesus Christ’s power, in a 
unique blend of folkloristic and religious inspirations. 
11) Some criticize the fact that too many blanco-mestizos are in Morales’ government, thus 
reproducing colonial patterns and toning down the political changes. 
12) Since the 1990s, a major improvement occurred thanks to substantial investments 
(partly provided by foreign donors) and a national educational reform.
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interested in modern arts museums, in the latest Western music, literature 
and fashions, in information technology and in travelling than in indige-
nous worldviews or traditions. They would have the ambivalent position 
of many “decent” Latin American middle classes: being proud of the indig-
enous colourfulness of their country and the tourism it attracts, but feeling 
reluctant to be identified with the “underdeveloped” world contradicting 
their hope to be idetified as members of the Western cultural universe. In 
this sense, they might share an (albeit differently perceived) preference for 
the “modern” with the landholding elites of the Media Luna. In a country 
dominated by Spanish-spoken and-written official and public discourse, a 
country with a Western style political structure, a country in which tradi-
tionally all the better jobs were in practice inaccessible for citizens with a 
indigenous background, they were – and are – elite, whether they liked it 
or not. They were the white-collar workers hiring the indigenous, they 
were the teachers educating the indigenous, they were the voices making a 
plea for a better deal for the indigenous, and they were the travel agencies 
bringing the tourists to the archaeological sites and the “authentic” indig-
enous communities. Their “distinction” has been related to their upbring-
ing, their eloquence, their informal but western dress, and their 
always-present ethnic identity – an identity-distinction that everybody in 
Bolivia, in all circumstances, is always aware of, and is impossible to untie 
through a mere societal make-up.
The taken-for-grantedness of this all changed with Morales’ presidency. 
This group sympathises with Morales’ political stand. They voted for him. 
They identify with the leftist ideological position present in Morales’ cam-
paign and policies. But they are not indigenous, and feel uneasy about the 
ethnic card continuously played out by the new administration. They are 
concerned about what exactly a “decolonising” education system would 
entail for them, and they are reluctant about learning an indigenous 
 language – as proposed in the education bill waiting for approval in parlia-
ment. They cannot imagine a “communitarian democracy.” The confidence 
about the whole series of tacitly accepted accesses and entitlements they 
have always felt because of their societal position, today is withering. It 
is an elite, which might be politically close to Morales, especially in his 
 anti-authoritarian qualities and in terms of their disgust for their more 
 narrow-minded peer’s discrimination, but there is some vacillation about 
their place in the ethnically circumscribed universe Morales sometimes 
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presents. They differ from Morales’ popular supporters in that they appre-
ciate his ideology, anti-elitism and his rescue of democracy as a trustable 
system – but they vacillate when it comes to the “indigenous” Bolivia.
The situation is different for the better off urban indigenous. As far as 
“ethnic prestige” is concerned, they have won an important battle. No 
longer are they the slighted group of “rich but improper”; today they are 
the “rich and acknowledged.” At the same time, they may have something 
to loose. They accumulated their wealth in the “niches” of the hitherto 
politico-economic system; a system unwilling and unable to make every-
body abide the law, go by the rules and pay his taxes. It was the system 
which privileged the cunning, which was lubricated by bribes and corrup-
tion, and celebrated immunity. One of the elements of Morales’ pro-
gramme is to undo these “breaks” for the better-off – mainly the traditional 
elites, but also the powerful indigenous traders hiding in informality or 
exploiting the deficient customs and labour controls. Tighter controls to 
reduce smuggling, to protect the local industry and the workers, and tax 
levying, to increase state income and reduce unequal access to  opportunities, 
would definitely harm these groups of affluent Aymara and Quechuas.
The ethnic composition of La Paz requires full attention. In the city, 
clear-cut racial distinctions do not work. Historically, many indigenous 
“became” mestizo, thanks to dressing Western, speaking Spanish and 
becoming construction worker or artesano instead of working in agricul-
ture. Returning to their communities, however, they would be “Indian” 
again. Thus, in specific interactions and settings, identities might shift 
continuously. At the same time, until recently, being an “Indian” in La Paz 
would bring about discrimination and disparagement. This made the 
“play” with one’s identity an ongoing one and a strategic endeavour. Most 
likely, over half of the city of La Paz is, and has always been, of “more-than-
half ” indigenous origin. What has changed is their position in the city. The 
process dates from long before the election of the first indigenous presi-
dent. It is part of the indigenous emancipation and increase in self-esteem 
that marked the continent as a whole. According to most observers in 
recent years there has been a reverse in the decline in wearing the tradi-
tional female indigenous attire, the pollera (multiple long skirts), the hair 
worn in a double tail, and the bowler hat. The city of La Paz now is, at least 
partially, not only diffidently, but brashly indigenous. The pioneers of this 
dynamic were the inhabitants of the historically indigenous districts of the 
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city, the somewhat higher-up, habitually poorer districts of La Paz. The 
“landless”, urban indigenous dedicating themselves to being traders and 
market sellers have prospered thanks to the lax control of international 
commerce and the informalisation of the economy since the mid 1980s. 
An important vehicle for the advance of many of these people, who often 
came from the countryside in the 1960s and 1970, were the fraternidades, 
religious groupings, regional organizations, dancing ensembles and bond-
ing associations all-in-one. Often having somewhat strained relations with 
the official Catholic Church and with the local parish priests, these frater-
nities became protagonists in the yearly dance-procession in La Paz: the 
Fiesta del Gran Poder (Guss 2006). At the same time, they frequently 
counted in their midst some very wealthy members. Being unable and 
reluctant to enter the blanco-mestizo business circles and neighbourhoods, 
they would exult their prosperity in and through the increasingly massive, 
flamboyant and unabashed parade of Gran Poder. As the prominence of 
Gran Poder increased, so increased the prestige obtained by participating in 
it, co-financing it, and demonstrating, through the purchase and use of 
immensely costly costumes, one’s riches and one’s success. “For them [the 
indigenous inhabitants] the dance would be a vehicle through which the 
city would be remapped, erasing old boundaries and with them the stig-
mas that had been long associated with native cultures. Through the osten-
tatious display of their new economic power the dancers would inevitably 
receive the respect and acceptance that had always eluded them. Or at least 
that was the hope, as using dance to negotiate new social realities can be 
fraught with ambiguity and conflict [. . .], these dances reflect the contra-
diction and tragedy of “group[s] poised in the space between two cultures” 
(Salomon 1981:164) – neither rural nor urban, traditional nor modern, 
Indian nor mestizo” (Guss 2006: 318; Albó and Barrios 1993). This elite is 
ethnically close to Morales, but politically, the differences in interests might 
be considerable. Additionally, their wish to “show off ” at the parades and 
in the fraternidades sits uneasy with the political and economic levelling-
out tendency of Morales’ administration. Their political stand has hitherto 
remained undefined, but their “demonstration effect” as examples of a dif-
ferent type of indigenous (instead of blanco-mestizo) elitism is hard to 
 overestimate.
And finally, there are the stern, ideologically motivated supporters, 
the ones politically dyed in the wool. Many of them were leaders of the 
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 multifarious social movements that, with their incessant protests, brought 
down previous presidents and brought Morales his presidency. They are 
both mestizo and indigenous, although a majority might be indigenous. 
Most of their elite-emblems are anti-emblems. They often reject protocol, 
and pomp and circumstance. They will not have any of the grandeur of 
government formalities, and in many cases even have an ambivalent rela-
tionship with the current government because it is government. They prefer 
“movements” to “institutions”, and “struggle” over “governance” (although 
this is a group that in the end does have confidence in the formation of a 
“de-colonized” state) and take pride in their “decent poverty”, their indige-
neity and colloquial vocabulary and codes. An anecdote told by Assies and 
Salman (2005: 293) on indigenous leader Felipe Quispe might illustrate 
the point: “In September 2002, threatening roadblocks, he (Felipe Quispe, 
ts/xs) cited the (at the time, ts/xs) incoming government to a dialogue in 
the hardly accessible community of Amaguaya “where there is no water or 
electricity” in order to make them “descend from their palaces and know 
reality on the ground.” He invited the president and his ministers to share 
in a fricasé de vicuña13 to which they finally acceded. With his peculiar 
sense of humour Quispe commented that the presidential delegation left 
the place with a diarrhoea (personal communication, 7 October 2002).”
Others however have entered government circles. They are in ministries, 
in parliament, in the constitutional assembly installed by the current 
administration, in strategic state institutions and in committees established 
by the executive to study future policies or recommend on existing ones. 
They of course share, to a certain degree, in the booty that comes with such 
positions. But they are very much aware of the vigilance of their “bases” 
(Crabtree 2005: 96), and in general keep a low profile in terms of demon-
strating the fruits of their elevation. The insignias of their new elite status 
are and remain first and foremost the political ones: their ability to mobi-
lize, to spur a crowd, to be eloquent and to phrase the demands of their 
people in a convincing way. In the second place, however, their ability to 
“come close” to the central power-holders, and to get things done for their 
supporters, has expanded. But this is no visible elite-badge they are carry-
ing around; their status depends on something, which, in the end, only 
exists if articulated among their followers. Their elite status is a virtual one: 
13) Fricasé is a traditional Bolivian plate, a spicy meat stew. The vicuña is a camelid, related 
to but much smaller than the lama or alpaca.
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it is not recognized by the traditional elites, not expressed in luxury or 
more “elevated” lifestyles. From their supporters’ point of view, it is 
acknowledged in terms of “political progress” and not as a recognition of 
any superior position. They themselves will often emphasise their humble 
background and their intransience as “ordinary people”, not too good for 
the most ominous circumstances to unite with their bases. An element 
possibly contributing to this configuration is that, traditionally, in indige-
nous communities including urban indigenous communities, leadership 
positions rotate. Therefore, it is not possible for leadership to be detached 
from “ordinary” life. A person’s prestige in the community depends on 
how he or she has performed as an authority during a term in office. More-
over, regular assembly-like meetings often take place and these are charac-
terized by massive communal participation. The mode of decision-making 
is frequently deliberative, lengthy and consensus seeking, rather than lim-
ited to pre-empted vote-legitimising statements. Instead of recurring to a 
personal sovereign status as “representative”, authorities consider them-
selves “delegates” in constant need to relate and to reconfirm their position 
and legitimacy (Rivera 1990; Delgadillo Terceros 2004: 107–109). “There 
is a strong sense of accountability among community leaders towards their 
grass-roots” (Crabtree 2005: 96). Additionally, they highly value (and 
practice as much as is possible) the ritual dimension of such leadership: 
they perform rituals when they entere the governmental palace for the first 
time, they take advice form yatiris14 reading coca leaves and performing 
libation acts, and they bring a handful of soil from their communities to 
join it, thus expressing the re-unification of the shattered indigenous peo-
ples of Bolivia.
This, then, is an elite not complying with many of the attributes usually 
connected to elite positions. Their position they owe solely to the political 
conjuncture. Most likely, they would vehemently reject being elite at all.
The shared element between these sectors of “hesitant new elites” sup-
porting the new administration is apparently their close link to this admin-
istration – largely produced by this administration in its effort to consult and 
deliberate over its plans with the Bolivian society. They are no longer voters 
and/or lobby’s; they are continuously being urged to voice their opinion 
and/or are, especially in the case of the latter group, being  consulted by 
14) Yatiris are medical practitioners and community healers among the Aymara of Bolivia, 
Chile and Peru.
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the government to participate in decision-making, for instance through 
CONALCAM (the Coordinator Nacional para el Cambio) in which the 
social movements supporting Morales convene. The democracy in which 
the new elites participate, is one in which their view is repeatedly asked 
for. This incites them to go to their supporters, and deliberate. The idea 
is expressed in the popular saying Evo somos todos (“we are all Evo”). The 
whole idea is of course not without problems, exclusions and setbacks, 
and might in the end turn out untenable or promoting favouritism and 
nepotism, since the “job-reward” for party militants is deeply engraved in 
Bolivian politics. Nevertheless, it is an interesting experiment, challenging 
elites to perform as elites by undoing elitism.
By way of Conclusion
We looked at a country in which unstable elites are searching for their stat-
ure. Some can no longer be the elite they had always been. Others cannot 
yet identify with a new elite status they consider reluctantly but did declare 
that they would use their privileged position to invalidate privileges alto-
gether. The quandary both groups are in is of course a consequence of the 
spectacular political developments the country has witnessed. The “new 
elites” have drastically disrupted a societal hierarchy that had constituted 
the very basis of Bolivian identities, subjectivities and habituses for decades, 
if not centuries. This involves a political, an economic, and an ethnic dimen-
sions. In all three respects, specific codes of conduct, attires, emblems and 
self-perceptions were shattered, to such a degree that the whole idea of an 
acknowledged, consolidated or even discernable elite in Bolivian society 
was corroded. The old elites, at least segments among them, responded to 
the loss of both their position and the societal imagery of hierarchy it was 
connected to, with despair, panic and heartless violence. On their side, the 
new elites are reluctant or hesitant about how to comply with their new 
positions. They are partially supported by populations whose own history 
prevents the population to fully identify with any claim for status, opulence 
and even authority. New elites in Bolivia today are a bit confused and their 
recognition by society is hesitant, fragmented, and even denied.
The question of Bolivia’s elite is a conundrum: it is made up of a mixture 
of political elites preaching broad societal deliberation and participative 
democracy in a permanent way, and in that sense it is anti-elitist. It also 
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includes a new government-supporting elite which is fragmented, a bit lost 
and to some extent reluctant to perform as an elite. Third, we find the old 
elite, still strong economically speaking, but politically in shambles – 
shambles out of which some of them assembled a sinister atrocity of egois-
tic, land-based self-sufficient subjectivity bringing ruthless bloodshed to 
the country. Neither of these groups has any precise idea about how to 
behave. As for the landowning cynics, they are not even sure about the very 
humanity of the “populace out there.”
Bolivia is in a transition process, which shook up all available schemes 
and traditional marks of social distinction. At the same time, a new type of 
political leadership seems to be emerging. Altough still fragmented or 
sometimes partial, among new elite segments and among large sections of 
the population, a sense of a new political style and code (based on delega-
tion, participation and deliberation – instead of on “handing over” author-
ity) is rising. To understand the performance of the newly emerging 
“distinctive” groups, possibly new thinking is needed. Such new thinking 
would have to combine a focus on both the traditionally highlighted mate-
rial and the cultural-symbolic features of distinction, keeping in mind 
their political dimensions. The latter dimensions might, in some instances, 
alter or even largely disqualify the material or more symbolic signs of 
 distinction.
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